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Abstract Communication networks are constructed as
a multilevel stack of infrastructure, protocols, and mech-
anisms: links and nodes, topology, routing paths, inter-
connected realms (ASs), end-to-end transport, and ap-
plication interaction. The resilience of each one of these
levels provides a foundation for the next level to achieve
an overall goal of a resilient, survivable, disruption-
tolerant, and dependable Future Internet. This paper
concentrates on three critical resilience disciplines and
the corresponding mechanisms to achieve multilevel re-
silience: redundancy for fault tolerance, diversity for
survivability, and connectivity for disruption tolerance.
Cross-layering and the mechanisms at each level are
described, including richly connected topologies, mul-
tipath diverse routing, and disruption-tolerant end-to-
end transport.
Keywords resilient, survivable, disruption-tolerant
Future Internet · dependability, reliability, availability,
performability · redundancy, diversity, eventual
connectivity · cross-layer optimisation · multilevel
network analysis
1 Introduction and Motivation
The increasing importance of the Global Internet has
led to it becoming one of the critical infrastructures [2]
on which almost every aspect of our lives depend. Thus
it is essential that the Internet be resilient, which we
define as the ability of the network to provide and
maintain an acceptable level of service in the face of
various faults and challenges to normal operation [62,
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63]. It is generally recognised that the current Inter-
net is not as resilient, survivable, dependable, and se-
cure as needed given its increasingly central role in so-
ciety [1,3–5,21,58]. Thus, we need to ensure that re-
silience is a fundamental design property of the Future
Internet, and seek ways to increase the resilience of the
current and future Internet. This requires an under-
standing of vulnerabilities of the current Internet, as
well as a methodology to test alternative proposals to
increase resilience. In particular, we are interested in
understanding, modelling, and analysing the properties
of dependability that quantifies the reliance that can be
placed on the service delivered including reliability and
availability [7,31] and performability that quantifies the
level of performance [36–39] when the network is chal-
lenged. This notion of resilience subsumes survivability
that is the ability to tolerate the correlated failures that
result from attacks and large-scale disasters [15,16,20,
34,40,47,64] and disruption-tolerance that is the abil-
ity to communicate even when stable end-to-end paths
may not exist due to weak channel connectivity, mobil-
ity, unpredictable delay, and energy constraints [17,29,
64].
This paper presents a brief survey of techniques to
achieve resilience in terms of fault-tolerance, survivabil-
ity, and performability, at every level of the network
and is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews
the ResiliNets strategy and design principles (with em-
phasis on redundancy, diversity, and connectivity) and
discusses the importance of cross-layering. Section 3
discusses resilience at each level: physical infrastruc-
ture, network topology, path routing, inter-realm, end-
to-end transport, and applications. Section 4 describes
the multilevel state-space resilience metric. Section 5
concludes with a summary. This invited paper is based,
in part, on a tutorial given at RNDM 2011 (IFIP/IEEE
Reliability Networks Design and Modeling) in Budapest.
2 Strategy, Principles, Multilevel Architecture
This section presents a brief review of the ResiliNets
strategy and principles and that form the foundation
for resilience techniques at multiple levels of the net-
work to provide overall fault tolerance, survivability,
and disruption tolerance. The importance of interlevel
translucency and a model for cross-layering are also pre-
sented.
2.1 ResiliNets Strategy
The ResiliNets D2R2+DR strategy (described in de-
tail [63]) has been developed for the architecture and
design of resilient systems, consisting of nested control
loops, as shown in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1 ResiliNets strategy
At the center is structural passive defence that
resists challenges to the network, such as the redun-
dant, diverse topologies described in Section 3.2. This
is surrounded by a pair of control loops.
The inner D2R2 real-time loop consists of four phases
of operation in every network subsystem and protocol:
Active defence resists attacks and challenges on the
network using mechanisms such as filtering on known
signatures. When challenges do manage to penetrate
the network, context-aware detection mechanisms
trigger adaptive remediation mechanisms such as dy-
namic rerouting and walling off compromised systems
that aim to deliver the best service possible after an ad-
verse event and during an ongoing challenge or attack.
Finally, recovery mechanisms and infrastructure rede-
ployment are used to bring the network back to normal
operations and acceptable service for all users.
The outer DR background loop is used to diagnose
the root cause of why a challenge was able to penetrate
the network, and to perform an analysis of the entire
inner loop operation to refine future behaviour for im-
proved D2R2 inner-loop operation.
2.2 Resilience Principles
The ResiliNets strategy motivates a set of design prin-
ciples for resilient systems [62,63], which include pre-
requisites (service requirements, normal behaviour un-
derstanding, threat and challenge models, metrics, het-
erogeneity); tradeoffs (resource tradeoffs, complexity,
state management); enablers (self-protection, connec-
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Fig. 2 Resilience principles
tivity, redundancy, div rsity, multilevel, context aware-
ness, translucency); and behaviour (self-organising and
autonomic, adaptable, evolvable), as shown in Figure 2.
2.2.1 Redundancy, Diversity, and Connectivity
In this paper we concentrate on seven of the resilience-
enabling principles (quoted in part from [63] that de-
scribes all of the principles in greater detail); begin-
ning with the enablers to fault-tolerance, survivability,
and disruption tolerance: redundancy, diversity, and
connectivity and association.
Redundancy in space, time, and information in-
creases resilience against faults and some challenges if
defences are penetrated. Redundancy refers to the repli-
cation of entities in the network, generally to provide
fault-tolerance. In the case that a fault is activated and
results in an error, redundant components are able to
operate and prevent a service failure. It is important
to note that redundancy does not inherently prevent
the redundant components from sharing the same fate,
motivating the need for diversity.
Diversity is closely related to redundancy, but has
the key goal to avoid fate sharing. Diversity in space,
time, medium, and mechanism increases resilience against
challenges to particular choices, and consists of pro-
viding alternatives so that even when challenges im-
pact particular alternatives, other alternatives prevent
degradation from normal operations. Diverse alterna-
tives can either be simultaneously operational, in which
case they defend against challenges [53,55], or they may
be available for use as needed to remediate. Diversity
is an essential technique to provide survivability.
Connectivity and association among commu-
nicating entities should be maintained when possible
based on eventual stability, but information flow should
still take place even when a stable end-to-end path does
not exist based on the eventual connectivity model [64],
using DTN (disruption-tolerant networking) techniques
such as partial paths, store-and-forward with custody
transfer, and store-and-haul (store-carry-forward).
Thus, each of these principles has a direct role in a
particular aspect of resilience:
– redundancy for fault tolerance
– diversity for survivability
– connectivity for disruption tolerance
2.2.2 Multilevel Principles
Four additional principles capture the aspects of re-
silience mechanisms operating at multiple levels in the
network: multilevel resilience, context awareness,
translucency, and resource tradeoffs.
Multilevel resilience is needed in three orthog-
onal dimensions: protocol layers in which resilience at
each layer provides a foundation for the next layer above;
planes: data, control, and management; and network
architecture inside-out from fault-tolerant components,
through survivable subnetwork and network topologies,
to the Global Internet including attached end systems
and applications.
Context awareness is highly related to multilevel
resilience, which allows the networked systems to sense
the communication environment and detect when a
challenge has penetrated the network, and adaptable
and autonomic behaviour that permits the system to
react and optimise as part of the remediation process








Fig. 3 Cross-layer knobs and dials
Translucency permits cross-layer and plane inter-
actions, and is critical to optimising resilience across
levels. Figure 3 depicts simple cross-layering, in which
the application sets knobs based on its service require-
ments to be conveyed to the network below. The net-
work uses these to optimise its behaviour, and coveys
its state up to the application via dials, which allow the
application to optimise and further adjust its knobs [13,
65].
The multilevel aspect of resilience analysis is dis-
cussed in Section 2.3. Figure 4 depicts a multilevel cross-
layering model, for simplicity showing only two levels:
E2E (end-to-end) and HBH (hop-by-hop). As described
4 James P.G. Sterbenz et al.





















Fig. 4 E2E and HBH cross-layering
in Section 2.3, there are additional levels in the architec-
ture, and in particular the third data-plane inter-realm
level between HBH and E2E that interconnects het-
erogeneous (sub-)network realms. This model builds on
the taxonomy originally introduced for ETEN (explicit
transport error notification) [30].
Resource tradeoffs determine the deployment of
resilience mechanisms. The relative composition and
placement of these resources must be balanced to opti-
mise resilience and cost. The maximum availability of
a particular resource serves as a constraint in these op-
timisations. Resources to be traded against one-another
include bandwidth, memory [43], processing, latency [65],
energy, and monetary cost. Of particular note is that
maximum resilience can be obtained with unlimited
cost, but there are cost constraints that limit the use
of enablers such as redundancy and diversity. In the
context of multilevel resilience, resource optimisation
is done across levels. While each level forms a resilient
foundation on which the next level operates, the re-
silience of the upper level can compensate for limited
resilience of the level below, helping limit the cost of
both levels.
2.2.3 Cross-Layer Model
Cross-layer signalling is implemented as downward knobs
K that influence the behaviour of the level below, and
as upward dials D that instrument the characteristics
of a layer. Cross-layer signals (K,D) are a combination
of in-band controls embedded in PDU (protocol data
unit) headers (k,d) and out-of-band signalling mes-
sages (K,D), thus (K,D) = (K∪ k,D∪d). Data flows
vertically between layers and horizontally within lay-
ers as shown by the thick arrows (for clarity only uni-
directionally) in Figure 4. In-band signalling (k,d) is
shown by the narrow line associated with the data ar-
rows; explicit out-of-band signals (K,D) are shown by
dashed arrows in both the forward and reverse direction
of data flow. Every node collects context information cn
about its environment at layer Ln (for simplicity in the
figure not all HBH context gathering is shown). At a
given layer, context and cross-layer fields are computed
as they flow through the nodes. For example, if the
HBH dial to E2E transport is BER error rate, then as
a packet flows through the network the BER is recom-













Fig. 5 Cross-layer model
Figure 5 shows a single node containing a protocol
state machine and its state at level n. Vertical controls
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represented as (Kn+1→n,Dn←n−1) indicate knobs down
from layer n+1 and dials up from layer n−1. Horizontal
signals are represented as (Kn→n,Dn←n).
2.2.4 Cross-Layer Composition
Multiple layers can be composed either by concatena-











Fig. 6 Cross-layer composition
In the case of concatenation, a multilayer knob, dial
pair (Kn+1→n−1,Dn+1←n−1) is formed by the concate-
nation of individual single-layer knobs and dials:
Kn+1→n−1 = Kn+1→n‖Kn→n−1 and
Dn+1←n−1 = Dn+1←n‖Dn←n−1. Bypassing layers runs
the risk that the bypassed layer is not able to alter its
behaviour based on the knobs and dials opaque to it. If
multiple control loops bypass layers and overlap one an-
other (are not strictly nested) the risk of unpredictable
feature interaction is increases.
2.3 Multilevel Network Architecture
We now describe the organisation of the network ar-
chitecture into multiple levels, for the purpose of un-
derstanding, analysing, and reasoning about network
resilience.
The three dimensions of multilevel resilience and re-
lationship to the ResiliNets strategy dimension is shown
in Figure 7 (not corresponding directly to the three di-
mensions of the cube). The three mseultilevel resilience
dimensions are protocol layer, protocol plane, and net-
work engineering. In each case, we can view the re-
silience of a level providing a foundation for the level
above. While this bottom-up view is useful, it is impor-
tant to understand that this is constrained by resource
tradeoffs, that is the lack of resilience of a given level
due to cost constraints can be compensated by the level
above. For example, a fully resilient network layer would
consist of a full mesh of strongly connected links, but
this is infeasible for almost all networks due to the cost
of n2 interconnections. Thus, a resilient transport layer
is designed to deal with an imperfect network layer.
The D2R2+DR strategy dimension is also projected
onto this cube. The inner D2R2 real-time loop exists
primarily in the control plane in the mechanisms that
implement the inner loop, but also in the data plane
to the degree that these mechanisms are part of data
transfer (for example embedding of FEC). The DR
outer loop is related to the management plane in the
long-term analysis and evolution of network resilience
architecture and mechanisms.
2.3.1 Protocol Layer Dimension
The protocol layer dimension is the conventional lay-
ered network abstraction model, showing some of the
alternatives that might be chosen at each level; in each
case these alternatives are dynamically adaptive based
on context awareness, particularly for remediation:
– physical layer using robust coding techniques
– medium access control layer alternatives (e.g. CSMA
vs. TDMA vs. CDMA)
– hop-by-hop link layer with alternative error control
(FEC – forward error correction, ARQ – automatic
repeat request, and hybrid)
– network layer with multipath diverse multipath rout-
ing and eventual connectivity
– internetwork layer between realms of diverse net-
work technology, policy, and trust [8]
– end-to-end disruption tolerant transport layer with
adaptive error control (FEC – forward error correc-
tion, ARQ – automatic repeat request, and hybrid)
traded against HBH error control
– application layer that is adaptive between service re-
quirements and E2E transport service (e.g. adapting
frame rate and resolution)
Cross-layer optimisations are shown by the cross-
layer loops in Figure 7. More detail on the techniques
at each layer are provided in Section 3.




































































Fig. 7 Multilevel mechanisms and ResiliNets strategy
2.3.2 Protocol Plane Dimension
The protocol plane dimension is the division into data,
control, and management planes. It is critical that each
of these is resilient, and that the resilience mechanisms
across planes are translucent to interact with one-
another, as shown by the cross-plane loops in Figure 7.
2.3.3 Network Engineering Dimension
The network engineering dimension is related to the lay-
ered view, but reflects the structure of the network from
an architecture, design, and engineering perspective.
At the bottom, individual components such as routers
should be fault-tolerant for dependable operation. The
network topology based on these components should be
survivable to the failure of multiple components. End-
to-end transport should be disruption tolerant to chal-
lenged topologies. Finally, the Global Internet including
the distributed applications should provide a resilient
service to users.
3 Multilevel Resilience
For purposes of multilevel resilient network architec-
ture, we concentrate on a set of six levels shown in
Table 1. These levels capture aspects of the protocol
layer, plane, and network engineering levels described
above. Note, in particular, that the conventional layer 3
is divided into two sub-layers: topology (3t) and path
routing (3r).
These levels are the basis for the description of mul-
tilevel resilience in the rest of this paper, in each case
considering redundancy for fault tolerance, diversity for
survivability, and connectivity for disruption tolerance.
3.1 Physical Infrastructure Level
The physical infrastructure level consists of the compo-
nents that constitute the network: links (wired or wire-
less associations) and nodes (switches, routers, servers,
end systems). The network infrastructure is also inter-
dependent with the power grid: when the grid fails net-
work components fail (and vice versa) [14,32]. This re-
lationship will be used as an example in Section 3.2.2.
3.1.1 Redundancy
Redundancy in the design of network components is
a well established technique for fault tolerance. Fault-
tolerant components contain redundant sub-components
such that random failures do not prevent the compo-
nent from continuing operation. The canonical example
of this is using triple-modular redundancy [33] as a way
to significantly increase system reliability.
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Table 1 Multilevel resilience metrics and mechanisms
# Level Metrics Mechanisms
7 application latency, throughput, QoE proxy servers, caching, content replication,
adaptivity
4 E2E transport path latency, goodput, PDR (packet deliv-
ery ratio)
erasure coding, adaptive error control, dis-
ruption tolerance
3.5 inter-realm realm connectivity and transit cross-layering, heterogeneity
3r path routing routing delay, overhead, path dependability store-and-haul, multipath, eventual connec-
tivity
3t topology graph metrics (clustering coefficient, largest
component size, betweenness, etc)
k-connectivity, p-cycles, diversity paths
2 physical link quality (FER, BER), availability, relia-
bility, Pr[component failure]
triple-modular redundancy, redundant
links, robust coding, HARQ
3.1.2 Diversity
Diversity in network components provides alternatives,
such that if a particular type of component is attacked
not all of them will fail. With respect to hardware ven-
dor and software system, this means avoiding mono-
cultures. For example, a large scale coordinated attack
against either Microsoft Windows or Cisco IOS would
have disastrous consequences on the Global Internet,
given the dominant market share of these end-system
and router platforms.
With respect to mechanism, diversity means a mix
of wired and wireless links such that if a wired link
is cut, the wireless can be used, and if a wireless link
is attenuated or jammed the wired can be used. This
diversity significantly raises the difficulty of effective
attacks against the network infrastructure.
3.1.3 Connectivity
Connectivity in the context of infrastructure refers to
mechanisms that permit information transfer across a
link even in challenged environments. This is typically
due to wireless channels with weak, intermittent, or
asymmetric connectivity. Techniques at the physical layer
include robust coding, and at the link layer adaptive
hybrid error control.
3.2 Network Topology Level
The network topology level uses the individual nodes
and links in the physical infrastructure level to con-
struct a network graph to connect the end systems
and servers with intermediate systems (switches and
routers). The goal of this level is to use the founda-
tion of resilient components to create a resilient network
topology.
3.2.1 Topology Redundancy
Redundancy in the topology means that the graph is
rich enough to be fault tolerant. At the very least a bi-
connected topology is required such that all node pairs
remain connected when any single link fails, and all
remaining nodes can communicate when a single node
fails. Note that dual ring networks such as SDH/SONET
provide bi-connectivity. Additional redundancy to mu-
tiple failures can be provided with k-connectivity [45].
Techniques such as p-cycles [22] can provide this redun-
dancy in mesh networks.
3.2.2 Topology Diversity
Diversity in topology is needed to provide survivabil-
ity against correlated failures, including attacks against
the infrastructure by intelligent adversaries with knowl-
edge of the network structure and its vulnerabilities, as
well as correlated area-based failures from natural dis-
asters such as hurricanes and coronal mass ejections.
Furthermore, topological diversity becomes an essen-
tial mechanism with the increasing interdependencies
between critical infrastructures. A sample scenario rep-
resenting an increasing power grid failure area in the
central region of the US is shown in Figure 8. In this
case, geographically diverse links in the ISP topology
can alleviate the impact of link failures as long as alter-
native link capacities handle the offered load [11,12].
Diverse topology design is an essential mechanism
that should be considered to build resilient networks. In
the case of the Baltimore tunnel fire [10,67], the redun-
dancy of having different service providers was useless
since different service providers lay their fibres through
the same geographic location. Therefore, not only log-
ical topology, but also underlaying physical topologies
should be considered carefully when designing networks.
However, increased geographical diversity increases the
build-up and operational costs of networks. Therefore,
optimising the network resilience and cost is non-trivial.
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Fig. 8 Topology diversity example
3.2.3 Topology Connectivity
Connectivity in the context of the topology level con-
sists of creating topologies that are richly interconnected
enough and are aware of weakly-connected components,
such that end-to-end stable paths are available when-
ever possible. The goal is first to maintain a connected
topology whenever possible, or practical given cost con-
straints, such that routing can converge; this is even-
tual stability [64]. Only when stable end-to-end paths
are not available does the path routing level need deal
with eventual connectivity, described in Section 3.3.
3.3 Path Routing Level
The path routing level uses the topology level over which
to route end-to-end paths with desired resilience prop-
erties. Resilient routing is able to route paths even when
the underlying topology is not very-well or stably con-
nected. In the case of dynamic networks such as MANETs
(mobile ad hoc networks), resilient routing is able to
discover and dynamically reroute paths as the network
topology changes.
3.3.1 Path Routing Redundancy
Redundancy in path routing means that multiple paths
are available between a pair of endpoints. This can be in
the form of alternate paths that can be quickly switched
(e.g. fast IP reroute [35] and SPGC [46]), or multipath
routing available to the transport layer so that a par-
ticular flow can be spread over multiple paths such that
the disruption of any single path does not disrupt the
end-to-end flow.
3.3.2 Path Routing Diversity
Diversity in path routing exploits diversity in the topol-
ogy level to create multiple diverse paths that can be
used by a transport flow. Several measures of diversity
quantifiy the degree to which alternate paths share the
same nodes and links: EPD (effective path diversity),
TGD (total graph diversity), and cTGD (compensated
graph diversity) [54,53,55,56]. The path diversity mea-
sures provide a single value that can evaluate the topol-
ogy and utility of added path diversity. Furthermore, it
is important to measure diversity in terms of physical
distances, not only node and link disjointness. The pre-
vious path diversity measures consider the sharing of
components, but do not capture the geographic char-
acteristics necessary for area-based challenges such as
large-scale disasters or to prevent the geographic fate
sharing of distinct links in the same conduit, as in the
Baltimore tunnel fire. The diversity measures can be
augmented with a minimum distance between any pair
of nodes along alternate paths, and as the area inside
a polygon or set of polygons, the borders of which are
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Fig. 9 Geographical distance and area diversity
3.3.3 Path Routing Connectivity
Connectivity in the path routing level consists of discov-
ering paths through weakly connected topologies, and
using the eventual connectivity model to communicate
even when stable end-to-end paths do not exist [64].
Traditional routing protocols require that a complete
path exists from source to destination before communi-
cation is initiated. This is true even for MANET proto-
cols that are able to frequently reroute in mobile net-
works, either proactively maintaining full topology or
reactively discovering routes on demand.
This eventual stability model of routing assumes
that routing converges eventually after partitioning. While
this is a traditional operating assumption, it does not
hold in networks challenged by weak, intermittent, and
asymmetric connectivity, or by high mobility. In these
networks, routing algorithms may rarely or never con-
verge to stable end-to-end paths. The eventual con-
nectivity model [6] relaxes the traditional assumptions
so that communication can proceed along partial seg-
ments [23] of paths between communicating nodes. In-
formation progresses as far as possible, along whatever
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paths possible, until it reaches its destination. This ex-
tends the concept of store-and-forward, and requires
modifying the typical forwarding behavior of dropping
packets if an outgoing link to the next node becomes
temporarily unavailable.
Communication over intermittent links is depicted
in Figure 10, in which all links are intermittent such
that there is never a complete path, but there are times
in which partial segments of a path are available. Data
can be moved as shown by the solid arrow. Then, when
the next two intermittent links become temporarily avail-
able, data progresses along the path of the dashed ar-
rows (and at this point the first link may become un-
available). This model of store-and-forward communi-
cation was adopted by the DTN (delay- and disruption-
tolerant networking) community [17], in which bundles
of information are forwarded through the network with




Fig. 10 Communication over intermittent links
Furthermore, it is possible to exploit mobility to
communicate when otherwise impossible. In the worst
case, eventual connectivity routing will store data un-
til a promising outgoing link becomes available. Proac-
tive control can be used in two ways to expedite the
transfer of data [64]. Movement control can be used to
exert control on other nodes to move them into range
such that a path toward the destination exists. Alter-
natively, mobile node can store-and-haul [64] packets
toward their destination by physically transporting the
data, as shown in Figure 11. This is now commonly
called store-carry-forward and message ferrying [71].
 
interference 
mobile data hauling node
Fig. 11 Store-and-haul data forwarding
High mobility often poses challenges to conventional
MANET routing protocols especially after they reach
their reactive limit. In this case it is necessary to use
knowledge of the location and trajectories of nodes to
predict future location without requiring rapid conver-
gence of routing algorithms. Trajectory routing [69], as
done in AeroRP [41,44,49,50] uses geolocation and ve-
locity vectors to compute destination node locations.
3.4 Inter-Realm Level
The inter-realm level is similar to the path routing level,
except that it is the interconnection between realms in
an internetwork. Realms provide the ability to internet-
work disparate networking technologies (that may not
be IP-compatible), and provide trust and policy bound-
aries. In the case of the current Internet, realms are
equivalent to ASs (autonomous system domains); in the
case of the Postmodern Internet [8], an inter-realm level
(layer 3.5 in conventional notation) provides internet-
working between realms using different addressing, for-
warding, signalling, and intra-realm routing paradigms.
3.4.1 Inter-Realm Redundancy
Redundancy in the inter-realm level simply means that
there are redundant realms and inter-realm links avail-
able for transit, such that the failure of a realm or its
attachment point does not affect nodes and users out-
side the realm.
© James P.G. Sterbenz!""#













Fig. 12 Diversity example
3.4.2 Inter-Realm Diversity
Inter-realm diversity requires diversity in geography and
mechanism, just as for the path routing level, as shown
in Figure 12. This is naturally provided to the degree
that redundant realms use different internal network-
layer paradigms and mechanisms. Geographic diversity
requires that realm service providers expose geoloca-
tion information about their nodes and links such that
SRLGs (shared risk link groups) [66] are avoided, to
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prevent the sorts of failures that occurred during the
Baltimore tunnel fire [10,67], during which users that
were dual-homed across different service providers still
lost connectivity because their fibre links burned at
the same time. Service providers are currently unable
and unwilling to expose the internal network structure
needed to achieve inter-realm diversity.
3.4.3 Inter-Realm Connectivity
Inter-realm connectivity refers to providing disruption-
tolerant forwarding through and between realms even
when the realm or inter-realm link is dynamically, inter-
mittently, or weakly connected; this is the inter-realm
equivalent of the intra-realm path routing connectivity
described in Section 3.3.
3.5 End-to-End Transport Level
The end-to-end transport level uses the paths that the
routing level has created to transfer data end-to-end
through the network between applications and users.
Resilient transport is able to adapt its mechanisms and
reliability services based on the application needs (knobs
from the application level above K7→4) and on the
end-to-end path characteristics (dials from the rout-
ing level below D4←3t). The ResTP resilient transport
protocol [48] (and its aeronautical subset AeroTP [50])
uses adaptive and composable mechanisms with cross-
layering to achieve resilience.
Figure 13 shows the possibilities for error control
at the physical infrastructure HBH (hop-by-hop) level
vs. E2E (end-to-end) transport level: None, Open loop
FEC, Closed-loop ARQ, and Hybrid (represented by
H = O ∪ C). The set of feasible choices is governed by
application service requirements. Reliable transfer re-
quires E2E ARQ (shown as the green or darkly-shaded
oval), due to the end-to-end arguments [57]. Quasi-
reliable transfer can be achieved by a variety of HBH
or E2E FEC or ARQ based on optimisations of a par-
ticular scenario (shown as the yellow or lightly-shaded
oval).
3.5.1 Transport Redundancy
Redundancy in end-to-end transport exploits multipath
routing to increase fault-tolerance against the failure of
individual paths. These paths can be available as hot-
standbys, permitting remediation by rapid fail-over to
the alternate paths. Alternatively, the transport flow
can spread across k paths using erasure coding such
that information can be recovered even if one or mul-






















Fig. 13 Composable error control
this is desirable for real-time service at the cost of addi-
tional bandwidth. ResTP uses the desired service knobs
from the application level in combination with the path
characteristics dial from the path routing level to de-
termine the degree k and whether to failover or spread
across them.
3.5.2 Transport Diversity
Diversity in end-to-end transport exploits diversity avail-
able from the path routing level to increase survivabil-
ity, communicated by cross-layer signals. The principal
types of diversity are geographic and medium.
Geographic diversity consists of specifying not only
the degree k, described in Section 3.3, but also the ge-
ographic distance d desired to meet a particular threat
model and service specification. For example, a real-
time service that is resilient to area based challenges of
diameter d would request spreading over k paths such
that no paths pass through node pairs closer than d
apart.
Medium diversity consists of choosing alternatives,
typically wired and wireless, such that challenges to ei-
ther do not affect end-to-end communication. For exam-
ple, a fiber cut is survived by wireless links; jamming or
weather-based attenuation [26–28] to the wireless link
is survived by the fiber link [63], as shown in Figure 12.
3.5.3 Transport Connectivity
Connectivity at the end-to-end transport level exploits









Fig. 14 End-to-end path composition
connectivity, but must deal with the possibility of indi-
vidual paths that are composed of hop-by-hop links of
significantly different strength and symmetry, as shown
in Figure 14; perhaps resulting in composed forward
and reverse paths of significantly different characteris-
tics.
A transport protocol such as ResTP (and its disruption-
tolerant subset AeroTP [50–52]) needs to follow the
general principle of DTN protocols [9,17,18,29]. These
include avoiding chatty round-trip signalling with op-
portunistic data transfer. ResTP provides explicit sup-
port for cross-layering (as described in Section 2.2.2)
with composable mechanisms [19] that are dynamically
adaptable to the instrumentation provided by dials from
the path routing and inter-realm levels.
3.6 Application Level
The application level is the interface to the user, and
relies on the end-to-end transport level to provide those
associations.
3.6.1 Application Redundancy
Redundancy in applications refers to multiple instances
of a particular application being available to a user, for
example access to email on a variety of platforms in
case one fails.
3.6.2 Application Diversity
Diversity in applications refers to providing alternatives
in the applications users choose. Just as it is essen-
tial to avoid monocultures in network components (Sec-
tion 3.1), they should be avoided in end system vendor,
operating system, and application.
3.6.3 Application Connectivity
Connectivity in the context of applications means that
they are adaptive and resilient to imperfect connectiv-
ity at the end-to-end transport level, and can optimise
service performance with cross-layer optimisations and
user-directed feedback. This can happen within an ap-
plication, such as adapting frame rate and resolution
of the available bandwidth and allowing the user to
choose the tradeoff (e.g. resolution for talking heads
and frame rate for action [68]). This adaptation can also
occur across applications, for example degrading from
video-conference to voice-conference to chat to email
as available bandwidth degrades. Furthermore, appli-
cations can provide feedback to users to more intelli-
gently direct their operation, for example in choosing
links to follow based on Web browser estimates on URL
(uniform resource locater) response times [61].
4 Multilevel Analysis
A resilience metric is essential for understanding the
resilience of current networks, and to evaluate alter-
native Future Internet architecture and infrastructure,
whether evolutionary or revolutionary. Ideally, this is
represented as a single number < in the range of (0,1),
where 0 indicates no resilience and 1 indicates infinite
resilience. This is clearly a difficult problem given the
complexity of network architectures and protocols at a
number of levels, the variety of challenges they must tol-
erate, the range of application scenarios, traffic demand,
and many parameters to characterise dependability [7,
31,42,70] and performability [36–39].
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Fig. 15 Resilience across multiple levels
4.1 Resilience Evaluation R
To gain tractability we formulate the resilince metric
as a two dimensional state space, as shown in Fig-
ure 15 [24,25,60,63]. The horizontal dimension is the
operational state N of the network, described as normal
operation (for which the network is designed), through
patially degraded to severely degraded. A resilient net-
work infrastructure is one that resists degrading even
when challenged. The vertical dimension is the service
provided P, described as acceptable (based on meeting
a service specification), through imparied to unaccept-
able. A resilient service is one that resists impairment
even when network operation is degraded.
Each of the axes (N,P) is an objective function of
a set of parameters; these may be a boolean, linear, or
other combination. We measure the resilience R as the
area under the trajectory from the initial state, gener-
ally acceptable service under normal operations, to a
challenged state S0 → Sc.
The relationship of the the state-space formulation
to the ResiliNets strategy described in Section 2.1 is
also depicted in Figure 15. The inner D2R2 loop trajec-
tory is shown. Defence prevents the system from leav-
ing its initial state S0. If a challenge causes the state to
change significantly, this is detected by a change in the
operational or service parameters when the state goes
to a challenged state Sc. Remediation improves the sit-
uation to Sr, and recovery finally returns the system to

























Fig. 16 Resilience across multiple levels
4.2 Multilevel Multiscenario Resilience <
In the multilevel analysis, as shown in Figure 16, the
service parameters at the level boundary Bij become
the operation metrics at boundary Bi+1,j+1. In other
words, the service provided by a given layer becomes the
operational state of the layer above, which has a new
set of service parameters characterizing its service to
the layer above. Note that the operational and service
metrics N∪P may directly correspond to the cross-layer
knob and dial parameters K∪B described in Section 2.2.
By beginning at the bottom level and progressing up
the service layers, an overall multilevel resilience value
can be computed [24], and by composing these across
all scenarios of interest for a given network architecture,
it may be possible to derive a single resilience value <.
5 Summary
Resilience is an essential property of the Future Inter-
net, including fault-tolerance, survivability, and disrup-
tion tolerance. Achieving overall network resilience re-
quires decomposing the network into levels such that
the resilience of each level provides a foundation for
the next.
This paper described three major aspects of resilience:
redundancy for fault-tolerance, diversity for survivabil-
ity, and connectivity for disruption tolerance. After de-
scribing a model for cross-layering, techniques to achieve
this were discussed at each level: physical infrastruc-
ture, network topology, path routing, inter-realm, end-
to-end transport, and applications. Finally, the compo-
sition of a multilevel state-space resilience metric was
described.
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